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I
Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. was masterful both as a judge and as
a phrasemaker. The study of law inevitably includes acquaintance
with his description of the common law: "The life of the law has not
been logic: it has been experience." 1 A typical Holmes phrase, the
description is striking, clear, memorable-and incapable of with-
standing rigorous scrutiny.
Logic may not be all there is to law, but clearly logic is necessary
to law. The justification for legal coercion is the proposition that like
cases should be decided alike, and without logic we have no assurance
that we can construct valid categories in terms of which to define like
cases. How, then, can one understand what Holmes has written?
Holmes was wounded in a war which was fought to gain freedom
for slaves, and which produced the political excesses of Reconstruc-
tion and the economic excesses of rapid industrialization. Experience
taught Holmes to live with conflict and paradox, to accept the propo-
sition that logic provides no easy answers to important questions. Ex-
perience sounds more flexible and organic than logic, but as a guide to
the correct decision, it fares no better.
"'[Brandeis],'" said Holmes, "'always desires to know all that
can be known about a case whereas I am afraid that I wish to know as
little as I can safely go on.' "2 Holmes was certain that facts alone-
the talisman which justified Brandeis's infatuation with the collection
of statistics-would provide no basis on which to determine how little
a judge "can safely go on." This divergence, on its face, is about tech-
niques of judging. Brandeis would agree, however, that when the task
is one's life rather than one's vocation, when the issue is that of mas-
tering reality as opposed to measuring up to the historically defined
standards of a given skill, then perfection is pointless even as an aspi-
Walton Hale Hamilton Professor of Law, Yale Law School.
'O.W. Holmes, The Common Law 5 (M. Howe ed. 1963).
2 A. Bickel, The Unpublished Opinions of Mr. Justice Brandeis 231 (1967) (quoting Let-
ter from Oliver W. Holmes to Felix Frankfurter (Dec. 3, 1925) (copy in Holmes Papers,
Harvard Law School Library)).
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ration, and the relevant issue becomes how little one "can safely go
on."
The divergence between Holmes and Brandeis, in other words,
involves matters of process rather than substance, and objections to
the Holmes position are at bottom objections to the validity of the
Platonic search for essences, to the proposition that what matters are
the forms of reality. The Platonic nature of Holmes's technique of
decision is made clear by his own description of it: "I long have said
there is no such thing as a hard case. I am frightened weekly but
always when you walk up to the lion and lay hold the hide comes off
and the same old donkey of a question of law is underneath."3
Brandeis, like Aristotle, replaces the search for the essential with
the techniques of categorization and analysis, and gains the certainty
that what is being dealt with is objective rather than subjective truth.
Such a shift has significant consequences. For example, if one seeks to
define tragedy, Aristotle's analysis is where one begins, but whether
Plato simply ignored the significance of art or was being ironic when
he disparaged the work of artists is an unresolvable issue. The shift
from Plato's search for underlying pattern to the Aristotelean descrip-
tion of the phenomenon itself comes at a price: the reduction of
meaning to function. Thus, Aristotle "explains" tragedy as the con-
struction of events that evoke the emotions pity and fear, whereas
Plato (were he to deal specifically with tragedy rather than treating
tragedy simply as an instance of art) would ask what it was about the
given events that evoked precisely pity and fear.
The question I have attributed to Plato is, of course, the question
Aristotle asks, but the latter's answer takes the form of a "how to"
book for the writer of tragedies. Both Aristotle and Plato seek to
order reality; they differ in what they accept as a satisfactory alterna-
tive to the possibility that life is the plaything of chance, a succession
of random events.
Thus, the same events may evoke different emotions in different
people; and, even in just one person, the same event may produce
different emotions at different times, or conflicting emotions at the
same time. Order, however, requires a stable correlation between the
fact of occurrence and the fact of feeling, and tragedy as analyzed by
Aristotle is an attempt to establish such a correlation. Such a stable
correlation is rendered problematic by what we perceive as the serial
nature of events, which includes the possibility of change.
A fixed concept of tragedy fits different contexts differently, and
3o.W. Holmes, 1 Holmes-Pollack Letters 156 (M. Howe ed. 1941).
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because time passes, any viable concept must be applicable to a vari-
ety of contexts. The question of the tragedy concept's "fit" is an ex-
ample of the general problem of the relationship between the
particular and the general, the instance and the rule. Aristotle and
Plato lived in a society which, like ours, had ways to deal with this
problem. One was law, a set of principles that regulated the reality
with which humans dealt. Another was the supernatural, gods who
were portrayed as aspects of that reality, as personifications of the
states and drives that characterized the world in which humans lived.
Successful art orders reality without having to resort either to the
law or the supernatural because it functions as metaphor, suggesting
more than it states. This discrepancy was not a significant issue until
the Renaissance, when a style of painting known as Mannerism
emerged. "Mannerist" denotes craftspersons' self-conscious about the
reality they are depicting: painters, for example, whose vistas, on close
inspection, incorporate situations today's viewer would call "soft
core" pornography; artists whose work makes clear that the focus is
as much on the technique as on the reality that the technique por-
trays. Mannerism emphasizes how something has been portrayed
rather than whether it should have been: the way it is portrayed
rather than whether it reflects reality.
Mannerism is a style significant only in a world fundamentally
different from the one Plato and Aristotle lived in. The Greece the
Renaissance knew-the society which provided models for the art
known as Classic-was not the Greece in which Plato and Aristotle
lived, but rather something rediscovered by those for whom Manner-
ism was meaningful. The most significant difference between those
two worlds is monotheism, the belief-the oversimplification of the
supernatural-that God could be treated as a single entity present in
the artist's life, rather than as a plethora of forces inaccessible to ra-
tional speculation, powers uncontrollable by human effort. Greek art-
ists could be Mannerists, but they would not confuse the style of
mannerism with the meaning of art, the truth of the reality they
produced.
The reason for this shift in attitude toward technique was that
monotheism was a revolutionary event-a change in the context of
which humans visualized their existence. Thus, monotheism makes
possible an iconoclastic objection to art, the certainty that the artist is
attempting not to portray a portion of reality, but to demean the sin-
gle key to existence. By the time of the Renaissance, however, the
church-the human institution in which religion was embodied-had
become sufficiently corrupted to render the issue of iconoclasm moot,
1989]
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to permit discounting spiritual reality's significance, and treating the
Second Commandment as anachronistic.
The historical consequence of ecclesiastical corruption was the
Reformation, which once again made possible social acceptance of
spirituality-the personal meaning conveyed to the individual by the
events described in the Bible-as the basis for the Christian religion.
Until Luther translated the Bible into the vernacular, Latin or Greek
had served simultaneously to justify and to distance the institution in
which the Divine was incorporated. As always, however, change
came at a price. Acceptance of individual perception as a source of
truth meant both that iconoclasm reappeared, and that religion devel-
oped functional competitors other than the law: sources of social
truth concerning the ordering of reality known as art and politics.
To recapitulate, the art produced by Greek society was Classic,
meaning that truth for the people addressed by Plato and Aristotle
was coherent, that both the artist and the Platonic dialogue were por-
traying something accessible to rational scrutiny. Consequently, art
was unnecessary for the Platonic philosopher-king, and The Repub-
lic 4 -the dialogue concerning politics-can be read as a statement of
what humans should be, a metaphor either for the polis or for the
individual, a statement both of spiritual and material truth.
For Plato politics is applied philosophy, whereas for the Renais-
sance-as Machiavelli made clear-politics can be viewed as an in-
strumental activity, a matter of technique, a search for power for its
own sake. Once the normative propositions with which we justify our
actions are perceived as separate from the behavior we call "polit-
ical," Mannerism can be seen as a response to the dilemma presented
by humans being social animals. Treating technique as substantive, as
the point of the exercise, is a logical response to the perception that
those in power seek power for its own sake, rather than to make them-
selves what they should be. For a Mannerist, in other words, the rele-
vant question is not the nature of truth, but the attitude of the actor,
not the general proposition that character is destiny-the correlation
that underlies the Aristotelian view of tragedy-but the concrete mo-
tive of the specific lawgiver.
On the other hand, Plato and Aristotle addressed themselves to
an audience for whom tragedy was paradigmatic because of the
human ambivalence about heroism, the pity and fear that characterize
our responses to the fate that has befallen aspirations. Tragedy makes
us aware that prudence is as necessary as courage, that knowing what
4 Plato, The Republic, in Plato: The Collected Dialogues 575 (E. Hamilton & H. Cairns
eds. 1961).
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we want to be involves a danger: forgetting that social animals are
being themselves when they accommodate each other, when they sur-
render control of their fate to forces other than themselves. It re-
mains, however, to apply these perspectives to our reality, to the
society in which we live.
II
Politics as used here is the process humans use to deal with a
future they cannot control. Politics is tragic because we are all crea-
tures of the injustices to which we are accustomed, but politics can be
meaningful because humans are capable of imagining alternatives.
Realizing the possibility that things can be better involves
change, and the process of implementing social change requires a del-
egation to political agents of the power required to make the change
applicable to those who disagree either with the goal or the process
through which the goal is realized. We live in a republic established
on the assumption that individuals known as "monarchs" could not
be trusted with such power, and the system created by the founding
fathers is characterized by checks and balances designed to prevent
abuse of authority. It is remarkable that a system created to produce
deadlocks rather than results has operated successfully for two
centuries.
The functions envisioned for the legislative and executive
branches are made clear when they are viewed from the perspective of
corporate structure. Thus, the Senate was intended to serve the func-
tion of a board of directors, entrusted with protecting the enterprise's
long-term interests. The President combines the functions of chief ex-
ecutive and chief operating officer; and the House of Representatives
performs middle-management functions, bringing to management's
attention various constituencies' desires. This analysis makes clear
the crucial importance of the "lower" House. Like noncommissioned
officers in the armed forces, representatives are the people who oper-
ate the system, translating management's goals into directives applica-
ble to those performing the work, modifying management's long-
range plans to make them operational in terms of the short-term
desires of those whose lives are being planned. Representatives, in
short, are people who are charged with conducting political dialogue
in its purest and most intense form.
Recent developments in campaign finance law seriously threaten
the responsiveness of that dialogue. Thus, limits placed on the contri-
butions individuals can make to a political campaign resulted in a
shift to entities known as political action committees, and limits
1989]
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placed on the activities of such committees led to their specialization.
The result has been lobbying activity increasingly focused on matters
of technical detail inaccessible to the general public, including (in
many cases) the very people who contributed to the committee. The
relevant dialogue, in other words, has become so specialized that it
fails utterly in its task of providing a link between powerholders and
constituents. Today's dialogue in the House of Representatives is a
conversation between an incumbent and the lobbyists whose funds
render utopian the prospect of a successful electoral challenge.
The society depicted in The Republic was different not because it
was a republic rather than a democracy, but because all those in-
volved in the political process were equals-a situation made possible
by the small size of the polis and the economic system's institution of
slavery. Once the identity of those holding economic and political
power diverges, the distinction between a republic and democracy
necessarily begins to blur, and the social purpose shifts. The social
purpose of Plato's Republic was that of fostering a meaningful
existence.
In our society, the purpose of the political structure is to main-
tain a viable balance between individual liberty and the need for ac-
cess to economic goods greater than those required for nonpolitical
purposes if one is to have the freedom to engage in the political pro-
cess. The means adopted by the United States to maintain a viable
balance is enforcement of the guarantees of individual liberty con-
tained in the Bill of Rights, and that solution impacts directly upon
the political process by means of judicial interpretation of the free
speech guarantees contained in the first amendment.
III
The nature of the judiciary's participation in politics was most
clearly set forth in the proceedings resulting in the rejection of the
Supreme Court nomination of Robert H. Bork. The artistic style of
the Counter-Reformation-the church's response to the success of the
Reformation-was known as "Baroque," and it reflects the return to
classical principles in a context that includes awareness of Manner-
ism. The Counter-Reformation produced a resurgence of institutional
power within the church, made manifest by the emergence of the So-
ciety of Jesus, which utilized military experience to construct an order
whose function was spiritual imperialism. The Jesuit order's tools
were intellectual, meaning that the end of converting the world to the
true faith justified use of dialogue in which both the constraints of
logic and the lessons of experience were treated as technical means.
[Vol. 10:635
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Consequently, Jesuitical arguments were perceived as insufficient by
those who did not share Jesuit beliefs. What mattered was not the
validity of the argument, but one's attitude toward the end sought by
the Jesuit speaker. Thus, if one desired not to be converted, the valid-
ity of the argument being made was simply one of the factors to be
considered.
Bork's hearing is thus explicable primarily as a Baroque phenom-
enon, where what was being judged was the "conservative" nature of
the principles from which his arguments derived. Such a judgment
underlines the extent to which what matters is the judge's personal
beliefs. In this context, it must be remembered that both Holmes and
Brandeis were the two who made the dissent respectable, who per-
suaded the profession and the country that the individual judge,
rather than the court majority, might propound the more valid law.
The consequence for court and country in terms of first amendment
law is made clear by analysis of a concrete decision.
Perry Education Association v. Perry Local Educators' Associa-
tion I was decided by five members of the Court; the remaining four
dissented. The question decided concerned the validity of a collective
bargaining agreement which permitted the Perry Education Associa-
tion ("PEA"), but no other union, to have access to the interschool
mail system and teacher mailboxes. Before 1977, both PEA and the
Perry Local Educators' Association ("PLEA") represented teachers
within the school system, but that year PLEA challenged PEA's sta-
tus as a representative under the provisions of the act which estab-
lished the Indiana Education Employment Relations Board. PEA
won the resulting election, was certified as the exclusive representa-
tive, and negotiated the contract in question.
Both PEA and PLEA moved for summary judgment on PLEA's
claim that the contract provisions violated the first amendment. The
district court entered judgment for PEA, the court of appeals re-
versed, and the Supreme Court postponed its decision on whether it
had jurisdiction until after it heard the case on the merits. The juris-
dictional question arose because the court of appeals had held invalid
the contract as opposed to the state statute which governed the terms
of the contract. Had the statute been held invalid on constitutional
grounds, PEA would have had an appeal as of right. Since the ques-
tion presented involved only the particular provisions of the contract,
however, jurisdiction lay in the Supreme Court only by means of the
discretionary writ of certiorari.
S 460 U.S. 37 (1983).
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The Court, in other words, decided that it wanted to express its
views on the first amendment issue presented, rather than treating the
case as one involving issues of a single state's labor law. Moreover, it
so decided even though the majority and dissent positions had almost
nothing to do with each other. Thus, the majority saw the question
before it as one involving the location in which the claim to free
speech is made. In its view, what was crucial was that a school mail
system was neither a location in which free speech had normally
taken place, nor public property opened for that use. Its conclusion,
therefore, was that neither PLEA's access to the mail system before
the elections, nor the school authorities' periodically permitting pri-
vate, non-school-connected groups to use the system justified treating
the school mails as a "limited public forum."6
Contrariwise, the dissent in effect treated the contract as indica-
tive of official preference for the views espoused by PEA, and conse-
quently held that the contract violated the first amendment's
guarantee of governmental neutrality. Such a reading required disre-
gard of the court of appeals' explicit refusal to designate PEA's com-
munications "official business" and holding that the school district
did not "endorse" the content of the communications.
In terms of law, moreover, both the majority and the dissent read
as narrowly as possible the precedents on which the opposing argu-
ment is based. The judges in both the majority and the dissent treated
what they are doing as a science rather than an art, as the search for a
truth rather than an attempt to demonstrate that their view of reality
is the one most suited to resolve the dispute at hand. The Perry Edu-
cation Association judges did not connect the experience contained in
precedents to the case being heard, but rather attempted to produce a
more effective theory than the opposition, accounting for as many
precedents as possible, and hopefully not transgressing professional
standards in terms of the violence they did to those precedents which
did not fit their theory.
The decision in Perry Education Association raises the question of
the propriety of judicial regulation of speech. The distinction between
thought and action on which the right to free speech rests is viable
only if dialogue works, if the listener is engaged for such a sufficiently
long time that the contradictions in dialogue are accepted or resolved,
the symbolic meanings understood, and the temptations to action ana-
lyzed. Viable dialogue, however, requires a manageable number of
6 Id. at 47.
7 Perry Local Educators' Ass'n v. Hohlt, 652 F.2d 1286 (7th Cir. 1981), rev'd, 460 U.S. 37
(1983).
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voices supported by roughly equal resources available to each. Such
dialogue is made possible only by the interaction of the social, eco-
nomic, and political spheres-interaction which determines the size of
the population and the extent to which delegation of political power
occurs in elections controlled by interests with access to economic
power. If economic power controls delegation, then the political dia-
logue which justifies delegation (and the first amendment) ceases to be
responsive, and the judiciary interpreting the first amendment be-
comes part of the problem rather than the solution.
Bork's "conservative" principles consisted of economic conserva-
tism-opposition to the regulation of economic activity-and the
willingness to testify to a personal hierarchy of values, an expression
of the belief that a judge must justify the value preferences on which
he bases his decisions. The theory is that we must behave consistently
if we are to be trusted with power, and that only a coherent theory
justifies the. belief that like cases will be decided alike. Such a view,
however, takes us full circle to the founders' refusal to entrust polit-
ical power to an individual.
The question remains, therefore, the one with which we began:
why should a given individual-whatever his beliefs-have the power
to make law; what is it in a society governed by law that justifies those
making the law in the belief that a citizen should do what the law
says?
IV
Sir Karl Popper developed the epistemology most consistently
based on logic, the view that all we can learn is the concrete basis on
which we disprove theories. The political implications he suggests in
The Open Society and Its Enemies I are that the only governments that
can be trusted are ones operated by nonideological political parties
under a rule of law-in short, democratic capitalist societies. The en-
emies against which Popper was defending society were totalitarian
political parties, parties which validated their position by imposing
their truth upon the society they governed.
The connection between Popper's epistemology and politics is his
view that totalitarian ideology is the concrete realization of the Pla-
tonic form. It is the Platonic ideal, in other words, which is responsi-
ble for a situation in which persons with political power refuse to
abide by the rules of competition embodied in laws, treating the ques-
tion of legality as one involving means rather than ends. The issue
8 K. Popper, The Open Society and Its Enemies (5th ed. rev. 1966).
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Popper raises, therefore, is whether it is possible to make the Platonic
view of the truth as a matter involving substantive rather than techni-
cal considerations compatible with a society in which possession of
political power is kept separate from a claim to possession of the
truth.
That issue is the one with which we have been struggling. A
hierarchy of value preferences, a ranking of goals, is necessary if an
individual is to behave consistently; but if politics is not a matter of
choosing the individual one wishes to follow, if society is not to be
structured on monarchical or authoritative lines, then how can one
reconcile the need for consistency with the separation of that claim to
power and to truth? Thus, an ideological party can be seen, in instru-
mental terms, as the political expression of a social group engaged in a
self-conscious attempt to create a polis, to structure a community suf-
ficiently coherent to permit rational social and economic change.
Seen from this perspective, insistence on the rule of law is insistence
on the status quo, denial of the political function of legal activity, and
expression of the view that neither of the possible functions of law-
neither the understanding nor the requiring of a given correlation-is
capable of producing effective personal or social changes. Law's
nonpolitical function, in other words, is that of providing a structure
for whatever is going on.
A nonideological political party, therefore, if it is to be respon-
sive to the need for change, requires apolis governed by law, a society
in which political competition is constrained by rules subject to judi-
cial interpretation. Delegation in such a society must be perceived by
constituents as an effective political process, a process not manipula-
ble by economic power. Such a process requires separation of the eco-
nomic and political spheres, and this is possible only if the relevant
political parties are required to derive all of their revenues from eco-
nomic as opposed to political activities. This could be accomplished
in the United States by condemning (in the sense of a public taking)
two of the three television networks and transferring them to the two
major political parties. Such a proceeding would involve the retaking
of the "public" spectrum whose use by broadcasters justified a licens-
ing system that would have violated the first amendment had it been
applied to printed material.
The transfer of networks, moreover, would permit the parties to
present competing visions of both news and entertainment, pictures of
both where we are and where we want to be. Some might object that
development of cable technology will make the network system super-
fluous. In broadcasting, however, as in other industries in a capitalist
[Vol. 10:635
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system, economic power is derived not solely from possession of tech-
nology, but also from the ability and willingness to commit sufficient
capital to do better than the competition. There are theories which
argue that capital must produce either better services or better prod-
ucts, but the concrete decision to transfer two of the networks to
political parties would not be undertaken to test the validity of the
theoretical propositions that, in the long run, economic activity pro-
duces value as well as efficiency, that competition is a real as well as
theoretical force, that people and institutions in possession of power
identify and attempt to defeat competitors rather than recognizing
and working with peers, subordinates, and superiors. Rather, impera-
tive need is that of separating two closely intertwined aspects of the
human condition, the political and the economic.
That the third network remains in private hands would no doubt
be used to justify the proposed transfer on the basis that competition
by persons outside the established parties has not been totally elimi-
nated. The insistence upon the possibility of competitive activity is
the economic manifestation of our distrust of delegations of power,
our insistence on the autonomy of the individual; but if political activ-
ity is to take place, some delegation must occur. The proposal, there-
fore, is that we view politics as competing versions of the truth and
rely on the checks and balances in our political system to prevent the
government from becoming a "front" for the party in power, to pre-
serve the multiple facets of our political process: the responsive nature
of the dialogue between a political party and its members; the coercive
nature of the dialogue between a government and its citizens; and the
instrumental nature of the dialogue between the parties and the
government.
The final question is whether this is the best we can do, whether
no more effective or comprehensive solution to the problems
presented by political authority is possible. To summarize, law, like
religion, is a human attempt to account for the nature of the world in
which we live, and monotheism was a social fact which fundamentally
changed our perception of the polis, the political aspect of that world.
Once divine reality could be perceived as embodied in a single entity,
an element of ambiguity--of uncertainty about the nature of the
truth-was introduced into the human scheme of things, and the
presence of that element is most clearly apparent in our response to
the phenomenon we call "art."
If my argument is valid, the parable of the prodigal son-the
story of the reconciliation of the sinner with the community-should
display such an element of ambiguity. The parable, after all, consti-
1989]
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tutes the religious definition of community, and the complaint of the
elder son is economic in nature, that father "never gavest me a kid,
that I might make merry with my friends: But as soon as this thy son
was come, which hath devoured thy living with harlots, thou hast
killed for him the fatted calf."'9
The father's reply justifies expansion of the community: "It was
meet that we should make merry, and be glad: for this thy brother
was dead, and is alive again; and was lost, and is found." 10 First,
however, the father does the political, the mannerist thing, saying:
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